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Thepreceding chapters, which have been focused on the
effects of the VAT-CIT substitution on income distribu-
tion, investment, and international trade, certainly do not
exhaust the specific issues relevant to the evaluation of this proposed
change in tax structure. The issues were selected both because they
represented important areas of substantive concern and because they
were amenable to meaningful analysis within the confines of the
techniques employed here to assess the short-run consequences of
the tax substitution. All three have been of significant policy concern
and have been primary foci for the various debates over the desir-
ability of the value-added tax within the context of United States tax
structure.
However, a number of other important issues arise in connection
with a VAT-CIT substitution, to which the preceding analysis can
make some contribution. This chapter contains brief examinations of
several of these topics, including (a) intergovernmental fiscal effects
of the substitution, (b) resultant differential interindustry changes in
tax liabilities, (c) interindustry implications of possible wage-adjust-
ments accompanying the substitution, (d) probable differential re-
gional consequences, and (e) potential allocative effects of the
tax substitution.




Althoughnominally involving only two tax instruments, according
to the relative yield criterion which has been employed (equal change
in government revenue and expenditure), the VAT-CIT substitution
would have a number of direct and indirect fiscal consequences, as
discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.5. First, the reduction or repeal of
the CIT, if the benefits of this tax reduction were shifted, would
reduce prices of government-purchased goods and services. Similarly,
any failure to fully shift new VAT liabilities forward to purchasers
in the form of higher prices—a possibility that has not been con-
sidered here—would reduce £he net-of-VAT prices effectively paid
by government. Secondly, through the alteration of prices, the tax
substitution would cause changes in the revenue yields of other ad
valorem taxes. Also, yields of direct taxes, e.g., the personal income
tax, would be affected if the various tax changes were fully or
partially shifted backward to factors of production. Finally, further-
round price and income adjustments, representing responses to the
disequilibrium created by the tax substitution, would imply further
changes in revenue yields of various taxes and in government ex-
penditures. Strictly speaking, the compensating yield criterion used
here requires that all of the "first-round" manifestations of these
effects be incorporated. Specifically, ratesofother taxes should in
principle be held constant, and changes in yields of these taxes
induced by tax substitution should be compensated for by appro-
priate adjustments in the VAT rate. However, for tractability it has
simply been assumed that the nominal revenue yields of these
taxes are unaffected by the simultaneous changes in the VAT and the
CIT.
But even with these constraints, an important set of effects of the
tax substitution can be considered: resultant changes in the relative
budgetary positions of federal and state-local governments. Recall
that the yield criterion defining a compensating tax substitution was
applied to the consolidated budgets of all governments (equal mone-
tary surplus or deficit in national accounts terms). That is, the
change in revenue of all governments was required to equal the
change in expenditure of all governments; only the consolidated
surplus or deficit was held constant. Thus, the yield criterion could
be met but the fiscal condition of individual jurisdictions, or of
jurisdictions at different levels, could yet be markedly altered.
Consider the case of complete removal of the corporate income5
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tax.Denoting original CIT revenue by VAT revenue by and
the change in government expenditure induced by CIT shifting by
the equal surplus or deficit criterion requires that
- = (7-1)
Thechange in the surplus (deficit) is simply
(7-2)
However, this does not insure that the budgetary positions (deficits
or surpluses) of federal or state-local governments separately will be
maintained. The (positive or negative) change in fiscal surplus at the
state-local (s)andfederal (f)levelscan be simply defined as
=- - (7-3)
and
= - - (7-4)
it is simply required that the sum of these changes in the surplus
(deficit) by zero. Note that repeal of both the federal and state
corporate income taxes is stipulated, and imposition of a solely
federal VAT is assumed.
Thus, implicit in the yield criterion is some degree of revenue
sharing, either from federal to state-local governments or in the
reverse direction. The magnitude of this effective transfer will
depend upon the administration of the VAT, the degree of CIT
shifting, and the relative importance of federal and state corporate
income taxes.
For government as a whole, it is irrelevant whether government
purchases are exempt from the VAT or not. In the former case,
governments face VAT-exclusive prices (the VAT is not invoiced on
sales to government but sellers are given full credit for the VAT
invoiced on their intermediate purchases). In the latter case, govern-
ments face VAT-inclusive prices, since the VAT will appear both as
government revenue and expenditure, which thus cancel each other
in terms of the consolidated surplus or deficit. However, for state-
local government vis-á-vis the federal government, the alternatives
do differ significantly. If government purchases are exempt, state-
local expenditures will either by unchanged (if the CIT is not shifted)
or will fall (if the CIT is shifted). If purchases are not exempt (VAT760Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
invoicedon government purchases) state-local expenditures will
almost certainly rise, in relative terms, by up to the VAT rate, with
the magnitude of the increase depending on the degree of CIT
shifting.
Assuming CIT repeal, shifting of the CIT thus enters through its
effect on government expenditures. If the CIT is not shifted at all,
government (federal and state-local) expenditures at VAT-exclusive
prices are unaffected by the tax substitution. However, if the CIT
is shifted, then government expenditures at VAT-exclusive prices
will be reduced.
Relative state reliance on the CIT has an obvious effect, since a
federal tax (VAT) is being substituted for a federal-state tax (CIT).
If states make relatively little use of the CIT, then their revenue
positions will be only marginally affected by CIT repeal. But if
state corporation taxes are large relative to the revenues of these
governments, then the tax substitution will amount to a major shift
from state to federal taxation.
Briefly recapitulating,ifstate-local government purchases are
exempt from the VAT and if the CIT is shifted forward and if state
CITs are of minor revenue importance, then state-local surpluses will
be increased and the federal surplus reduced as a result of the VAT-
CIT substitution. But if state-local governments do incur a VAT
liability and if the CIT is not shifted and state use of the CIT is im-
portant then the opposite will occur.
In fact, as indicated by Table 7—1, the state-local (state) use of
the CIT is sufficiently important ($3.69 billion or about 10 percent
of the federal CIT revenue of $38.99 billion) that even with full
forward CIT shifting and federal exemption or rebate of VAT on
state-local purchases, state-local surpluses in the aggregate would
decline by $1.65 billion. At the other extreme, with zero CIT shift-
ing and no exemption of state-local purchases from the VAT, state-
local surpluses are reduced by $6.9 billion. In each case, the federal
surplus is necessarily increased by an equal amount.
Of course, it is virtually certain, politically, that state-local pur-
chases would be exempt from the VAT, i.e., either the VAT would
not be invoiced on government purchases or a full federal credit
would be provided to state-local governments on their VAT-invoiced
purchases. Thus, the range of the contraction in state-local sur-
pluses would be only from $1.65 billion (full CIT shifting) to $3.69
billion (zero CIT shifting), assuming, of course, the simultaneous
repeal of federal and state corporate income taxes.
In any event, the tax substitution itself would involve a form of
implicit revenue sharing from state-local governments to the federal
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2162Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
offederal for state-local taxes, a substitution which would almost
necessarily have to be supplemented by a reverse, but explicit, shar-
ing of federal VAT revenues with adversely affected state-local
governments.
The point to be made in this context is that all state-local govern-
ments would not be equally affected by the tax substitution. Assum-
ing effective exemption of state-local governments from the VAT,
those lower-level governments not employing a CIT would be either
unaffected (no CIT shifting) or benefited (reductions in expendi-
ture through CIT shifting). Local governments as a group would be
in this position, as would those states not currently imposing a
corporate profits tax (most notably Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and
Texas). Those states deriving the greatest proportions of their reven-
ues from the CIT would be most adversely affected (e.g., North
Carolina, for which CiT revenue was 8.7 percent of own general
revenue in 1967; South Carolina, 8.5 percent; and Connecticut, 8.1
percent). Thus, any federal formula intended to offset the adverse
state-local fiscal effects of this set of tax changes would either have
to distinguish between states according to the degree of their re-
liance on the CIT or would differentially benefit those states not
utilizing the CIT.
There is, of course, the possibility that federal removal of the
CIT would not encourage the states to follow suit, or might even re-
sult in increases in revenues from the CIT. Indeed, in those states
that allow the federal income tax as a deduction in computing the
base of the state tax, CIT reduction by the federal government
would, in the case of incomplete shifting, result in an immediate
increase in state CIT revenues.
In addition states may be induced to raise their rates to partly
fill the void left by the repeal of the federal CIT. However, such a
reaction is unlikely on any large scale or even on the average. First,
state CIT rates are as high as they are, at least in part, because the
state CiT liability can be deducted in computing the base of the
federal CIT.' With nominal (and in most cases, effective marginal)
federal CIT rates of 50 percent (in 1969), this amounts to an effec-
tive federal credit equal to 50 percent of the state CIT paid by any
corporation, thus dramatically reducing the effective rates of state
CITs. This federal treatment of state CITs has almost certainly
stimulated state reliance on this type of tax. Second, as has been
often argued, the CIT is not an "ideal" state tax. The fact that most
1.If the federal CIT is similarly deductible in computing the state CIT
liability, the reduction in effective state CIT rates may be even greater.A Miscellany of Additional Topics163
corporationsoperate in many states necessarily requires that cor-
porate profits be allocated among states by arbitrary rules, e.g., in
relation to property, payroll, or sales, using for sales either a des-
tination or origin principle. Most adversely, from an allocative point
of view, such arbitrary formulas almost certainly insure that even
under competitive assumptions the state CITs are shifted in specific,
discriminatory directions (onto wages in the case of origin formu-
las, or onto sales, with destination formulas). Because of the im-
plied excess burdens at the state level, major increases in state
reliance on the CIT would seem both undesirable and unlikely.
Third, the loss of administrative benefits flowing from the simul-
taneous use of the CIT by state and federal governments would
vastly increase the cost of administering state corporate income
taxes.
Thus, although the assumption of simultaneous reductions in
both state and federal corporate income tax rates was imposed by
data limitations, with complete federal repeal of the CIT it would
appear that states would probably not increase their CIT rates. While
in fact they might not reduce their CIT rates in step with federal rate
reductions, it is not too unrealistic to assume, as we do here (for
analytic convenience) that reductions in state CIT rates would be
made, paralleling the federal reductions.
As indicated above, in addition to differential fiscal consequences
for federal and state-local governments, intrastate differentials would
also be implied, i.e., local governments would necessarily benefit
from any price reductions resulting from the shifting of the CIT
reduction, but would not directly suffer from the CIT revenue loss.
Thus, the tax substitution exerts very different budgetary impacts
on different levels and units of government.
7.2INTERINDUSTRY REDISTRIBUTIONS
OF TAX LIABILITIES
Varyingdegrees of sophistication can beexhibitedin assessing the
effectsofa tax substitution. At its most simplistic, everything other
than tax liabilities could provisionally beassumedto be unchanged.
The analysis would then be restricted to examination of changes in
tax liabilities of relevant economic units. At a more complex level,
changes in outputs, prices, and factor incomes in response to the
tax substitution would be incorporated. The distinguishing mark
of these more ccmplex formulations is that the system is permitted
to respond to the disequilibrium created by the initial restructuring
and redistribution of tax liabilities.164Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate income Tax
Limitationsof knowledge and the constraints of the input-output
formulation have restricted us to the more simplisitic, first-round
end of this analytical spectrum, although prices and profit incomes
(capital earnings) have been permitted to vary in response to the tax
substitution. However, it is possible to use the first-round results to
project, albeit qualitatively, the likely directions of further dynamic
adjustments by the economy to the change in tax structure.
This projective application of the first-round responses has, in
fact been suggested in the discussion of price responses (Chapter 3).
These relative price effects were interpreted as indices of disequi-
librium created by the tax substitution, a disequilibrium which
would induce further-round responses. The investment and inter-
national trade chapters represented attempts to quantify the initial
responses in these dimensions to the first-round price effects of
the tax substitution. However, these price effects are derived entirely
from assumed interindustry redistributions of tax liabilities,as
represented in rather simple stipulations concerning the role of taxes
in price formation. Thus, a more direct approach to the assessment
of tax-substitution-induced changes in outputs, prices, and factor
incomes can be obtained by an examination of the tax-liability re-
distributions themselves. This in effect represents an analysis of what
Musgrave has called the "money differential incidence" of the tax
substitution.
To assess the money differential incidence of the VAT-CIT sub-
stitution,itis necessary to assume that prices charged by sellers,
inclusive of all taxes, are initially unaffected by the tax substitution.
Price adjustments then appear themselves as later-round responses
to the change in tax structure. Thus, it must be assumed that neither
the VAT nor the CIT is shifted initially.
In the case of the CIT, zero shifting is, as before, straightforward:
prices do not respond to the reduction or repeal of the CIT. The
VAT case, however, is more complex: under the assumption of full
shifting of the VAT, VAT-inclusive prices increased by the VAT rate.
With zero shifting,itis necessary that VAT-inclusive prices equal
prices prevailing prior to introduction of the VAT.
The first implication of zero VAT shifting is that the CIT-com-
pensating VAT rate is no longer equal to the ratio of CIT revenue
loss to the net base (personal consumption expenditure) of a con-
sumption-type VAT. Rather, the base, consumption expenditure
net of the VAT liability, will decline by the amount of the VAT
liability itself. Thus, if C is consumption expenditure prior to the tax
substitution and Z is the compensatory VAT rate, consumption ex-A Miscellany of Additional Topics 165
penditurenet of VAT, C, will become
C, =C-ZC'
=1 (75)




Assuming CIT repeal =$42.68billion), the resultant com-
pensatory VAT rate is 8.3 percent.
The second important implication of zero VAT shifting is that
effective purchaser prices associated with VAT-exempt transactions,
i.e., transactions for which the purchaser gets a credit for VAT in-
voiced, will decline by the amount of the VAT. Thus, effective
export, investment, and government prices can be viewed as de-
clining, and these declines represent an effective burden of the VAT
for the seller. In effect, the seller can be treated as viewing his gross
VAT liability as the VAT rate applied to his total value added,
regardless of rebates his purchasers may (or may not) receive.
The net burden of the VAT for any industry is then the VAT
rate applied to total value added (net of VAT) less credits for the
VAT invoiced on this industry's net investment goods purchases.2
The sum over industries of this net apparent VAT liability (VAT
burden) will exceed net VAT revenues of government by the effec-
tive VAT credits on export and government purchases.
The effective burden of an unshifted VAT, computed in the
foregoing manner by industry, is given in the first column of Table
7-2. The banefits of CIT repeal are given in the second column of
this table. The effective increase in the tax burden by industry (the
2. Note that the credit for replacement of depreciated capital has already
been incorporated by removing depreciation and other intermediate purchases
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.A Miscellany of Additional Topics167
differencebetween the VAT and CIT burdens) is given in the third
column; and the VAT as a ratio to the CIT, is the fourth.
Thus, under the foregoing assumptions the tax substitution would
replace CIT liabilities with apparently greater VAT liabilities. The
benefits of the CIT repeal would obviously be greatest in the most
highly incorporated industries primarily in the manufacturing sector,
for which the ratio of CiT to value added (fifth column of Table
7-2) is highest. Conversely, those industries exhibiting the lowest
degrees of incorporation, those benefiting most from special treat-
ments under the corporate tax, and those growing most slowly
(i.e., exhibiting the lowest ratios of investment to value added, as
indicated in the sixth column of Table 7-2, relating grossinvest-
ment to value added inclusive of depreciation) would be dispro-
portionately affected by imposition of the VAT.
The net effect of the tax substitution is then simply the differ-
ence between the newly imposed VAT burden and the rescinded
CIT liability. A positive number indicates that the VAT burden
for the industry exceeds the original CIT liability; a negative net
change indicates the.reverse. Alternatively, the ratio of the VAT to
the CIT (fifth column) indicates an increase in the tax burden if
greater than unity, a decrease if less than unity.
Most manufacturing industries would benefit from the replace-
ment of the CIT by the VAT because they are highly incorporated
and their capital intensities (ratios of profit to value added) and rates
of capital accumulation are also relatively high. Conversely, those
industries which are not highly incorporated and which have low
profit margins and low rates of investment relative to value added
would experience the greatest increases in tax liabilities. This is par-
ticularly true of the agriculture, textile, lumber, footwear, trans-
portation, and service industries.
These changes in tax liabilities thus measure the varying degrees
of pressure which would be exerted on different industries by the
tax substitution. That is, they reflect the magnitudes of the responses
of factor incomes, outputs, and prices which could be expected
ultimately to result from the change in tax structure.
7.3SHORT-RUN INTER INDUSTRY EFFECTS
OF POTENTIAL WAGE RESPONSES
Ithas been explicitly assumed throughout that nominal factor in-
comes, other than corporate profits, are unaffected by the tax sub-
stitution. However, significant initial increases in consumer prices
have been projected to result from the tax change, particularly if16WSubstitutinga Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
theCIT is assumed not to be shifted forward. Specifically, con-
sumption price increases of from 1.7 percent (full CIT shifting)
to 7.7 percent (zero CIT shifting) have been estimated to follow
from repeal of the CIT and its replacement by the VAT. These price
changes then imply corresponding reductions in real wages.
If it were assumed that in the short run the supply of labor were
infinitely elastic at the prevailing real wage, it would be possible to
project initial wage adjustments and changes in labor cost by in-
dustry. This would provide another direction from which the ques-
tion of the longer-run, later-round responses to the tax substitution
could be approached. Specifically, consider the case of full CIT
removal and zero shifting: consumer prices rise by 7.68 percent. If
itis assumed that initially wages rise, also by 7.68 percent, what
pressure will this exert on prices?
The short-run interindustry effect of this wage increase would ob-
viously reflect differences in the labor intensity of different in-
dustries. The ratio of employee compensation to value added, pre-
sented by industry in Table 7-3, provides a direct measure of this
labor intensity. Labor-intensive industries, those in which employee
compensation is a relatively large proportion of value added, will
be initially most affected by the tax-substitution-induced wage
change. Those industries include mining (75 percent), ordnance (85
percent), textiles (81 percent), furniture (82 percent), footwear
(84 percent), and miscellaneous manufacturing (83 percent). On the
other hand, employee compensation relative to value added is
notably low in such industries as agriculture (14 percent), oil and gas
(26 percent), tobacco (17 percent), utilities (28 percent), and real
estate and rental (2 percent).
Under the assumption of zero CIT shifting, of course, net cor-
porate profits have increased by the amount of initial CIT liabilities.
It might be assumed that at least initially the increase in employee
compensation is absorbed by profits rather than being passed on in
price changes. The pressure for further-round adjustments in prices,
profits, and wages would then be greater in those industries in which
the increase in wages exceeded the increase in net profit, i.e., ex-
ceeded the original CIT liability. The CIT savings (as a proportion of
value added), the hypothesized change in the wage bill, or employee
compensation (also as a proportion of original value added), and the
difference between the two are indicated by industry in Table 7-3.
Further adjustments will be most severe in those industries in which
this difference is positive (change in employee compensation exceeds
original CIT liability). Conversely, downward pressure on prices

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.170Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
arestill observed (a negative difference between the change in the
wage bill and the CIT liability).
Because these short-mn effects depend not only on labor intensity
(the labor share of value added), but also on average CIT rates, and
in particular on the degree of incorporation, the pressure will not
necessarily be greatest in labor-intensive industries. Thus, agriculture,
which is not at all labor intensive in terms of the labor share of value
added, registers an increase in the wage bill in excess of CIT savings
simply because of the very low original CIT liabilities. In general,
however, in capital-intensive industries, e.g., communications and
utilities, labor cost increases are considerably less than CIT savings,
while in labor-intensive industries,e.g., textiles and apparel, the
increases significantly exceed CIT savings.
It should be clearly understood that these consequences of a
short-run increase in wage rates, of a magnitude necessary to hold
real wages constant, do not represent an equilibrium adjustment of
labor and output markets to the tax substitution. Specifically, only
in the short run, before the system has fully adjusted to the change
in tax structure, would differential interindustry effects related to
the degree of labor intensity be observed. Ultimately, as wage in-
creases are incorporated in prices of capital goods, increases in
capital good prices induced by wage increases would lead to cor-
responding price increases in more capital-intensive industries, and
this effect is independent of the effective CIT liability of the in-
dustry. That is, downward price pressure exerted by increases in net
rates of return in industries incurring high CIT liabilities operates
independently of the upward pressures exerted by longer.run, econ-
omy-wide wage adjustments. Nonetheless, the comparison of po-
tential increases in labor cost and reductions in CIT liabilities does




insection 1.2, we noted that the predictive econometric models
commonly utilized to assess the effects of potential changes in feder-
al fiscal policy are inadequate for exaniing the differential effects of
3. These regional consequences were discussed more fully in a paper by
Dresch [1972a].A Miscellany of Additional Topics171
alternativepublic policies. One of the most important of these in-
adequacies relates to the level of disaggregation at which such models
operate. In particular, regional disaggregation has received virtually
no attention at all in this type of analysis. While the aggregative
models have often been critized for their lack of detail in the house-
hold and industrial dimensions, very little attention has been paid
to the potential differential regional effects of alternative federal
policies.
Correspondingly, the concern of regional policy analysts has been
focused, with few exceptions, on the effects of explicitly regional
policies for individual geographic areas. Government programs to
promote private investment in depressed areas, for example, have
been examined under quite confined assumptions concerning the
relationship of these policies to broader federal fiscal policies.
The possibility that general, ostensibly nonregional federal policies
might have as great or even greater effects for the geographic dis-
tribution of economic activity than ostensibly regional policies has
been left almost entirely unexplored.
The obvious source of this void in policy analysis is the lack of a
sufficiently refined conception of the determinants of the spatial
distribution of activity. Unless regions are viewed individually, as
closed, small-scale representations of national economies, no well-
elaborated schema for the analysis of regional economic phenomena
is provided by the corpus of economic theory.
While the development of an adequate conceptual representation
of the relationship between national and regional economic processes
is clearly beyond the scope of the present study, a rough approxi-
mation of the first-round differential regional consequences of the
VAT-CIT substitution can be attempted (the regions used for our
analysis are described in Table 7-4). This discussion will focus on
the potential regional impact of the initial changes in income dis-
tribution, investment, and international trade which would be in-
duced by the VAT-CiT substitution, and on the differential re-
gional consequences of possible wage adjustments.
7.4.1Income Distribution
Justas the VAT-CIT substitution has been shown (Chapter 4)
to be regressive nationally, redistributing income from low- to
high-income households, so it is also likely to be regressive region-
ally, redistributing income from low- to high-income regions. This
regional regressivity is in fact observed in this model, as indicated in
Table 7-5, which contains net changes in regional tax liabilities772Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Table 7—4.Regional Divisions of the United States






Connecticut West South Central (WSC)
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Note: In comparisons between the South and the rest of the country (non-
South) the South comprises the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West
South Central regions. The regions in this analysis correspond to U.S. Census
Bureau "Divisions," as found in, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and
City Data Book, 1967 (A Statistical Abstract Supplement), p. 2.
under the extreme assumptions of complete and zero CIT shifting,
assuming in both cases complete CIT repeal.
To avoid the necessity of developing household income distribu-
tions by region, the regional distribution of retail sales was used to
distribute any increase in nominal (VAT-inclusive) consumption ex-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.174Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
tributionof dividend income, as reported for federal income tax
purposes,increases in net profits (zero CIT shifting) and reductions
in investment cost (complete CIT shifting) were distributed.
It is readily apparent from the final three columns of Table 7-5
that the VAT-CIT substitution is regionally regressive, regardless of
the value of the CIT shifting parameter. For example, with zero CIT
shifting, the low-income Southern regions in the aggregate experience
an $3.05 billion increase in tax liabilities and an increase in the tax
burden in excess of 2 percent of disposable income in this area (see
penultimate row of Table 7-5). For the rest of the country, tax
liabilities are correspondingly reduced by almost 1 percent of dis-
posable income. With full shifting of the CIT, on the other hand, the
South's loss is reduced to $1.2 billion, or about 0.7 percent of dis-
posable income, while the non-South experiences an absolutely great-
er increase in tax liability of $1.3 billion, but an increase relative to
disposable income of only 0.3 percent.
In this context the relative significance of the regional effects of
national policy changes can be vividly indicated. Great energy is
expended modifying formulas for federal intergovernmental grant
programs to achieve particular distributions and debating the relative
desirability of alternative distributions. However, the net regional
redistributions achieved through these programs are almost invariably
less than those implied by the ostensibly "nonregional" substitution
of a VAT for the CIT. For example, Dresch [1972a] has shown that
the net increase in the South's tax liability due to the VAT-CIT
substitution, between $1.2 billion and $3 billion depending on CIT
shifting, exceeds the net benefit to the South of the $4 billion
federal welfare grant program ($0.403 billion net Southern benefit),
of the $11 billion federal nonwelfare categorical programs ($0.939
billion), or of any of three $5 billion income-tax-financed general
revenue-sharing (GRS) programs under discussion in 1971 ($O.467
billion for the original House of Representatives' program, $0.78
billion under Congressman Wilbur Mills's GRS proposal and $0.419
billion under the Nixon Administration's original GRS program).
Thus, while attention is focused on the regional implications of
various intergovernmental grant-in-aid programs, their effects may be
literally swamped by changes in national tax policy, the regional
implications of which are rarely even explicitly considered.
7.4.2Investment Effects
Theanalysis of the potential first-round investment effects of the
tax substitution (Chapter 5) was restricted to national responses
disaggregated only by industry. To project potential investment con-
—. SA Miscellany of Additional Topics175
sequencesby region it is necessary to distribute each industry's in-
vestment expansion spatially, not a simple problem. Information
is available on the geographic distribution of gross plant and equip-
ment expenditure by industry in 1969, but there is no reason to ex-
pect that the investment expansion will be distributed proportion-
ately to base levels of investment. Specifically, any increase in
investment is much more likely to be "new" investment, i.e., in
new plants and in basic new equipment, than is preexpansion gross
investment. The latter almost undoubtedly reflects heavily the main-
tenance of preexisting, spatially distributed industry capital stocks,
while marginal investments reflect the changing geographic dis-
tributions of these stocks, which these marginal investments in fact
bring about.
Although the capability for differentiating between total and
marginal distributions of investment does not exist, even ad hoc
assumptions employed to reach admittedly tentative conclusions
provide some insight into potential regional implications. For present
purposes, it is simply assumed that for each industry any region's
share of the short-run investment expansion is equal to its share
of base-year plant and equipment expenditures. However, the South's
share of plant and equipment expenditures (29.8 percent), for ex-
ample, is greater than its share of manufacturing value added (23.3
percent), probably reflecting its differential growth. Thus, simple
proportionality will almost certainly result in an understatement of
the South's share of the investment expansion.
If regional distributions of investment activities of all industries
were identical, then under the proportionality assumption each
region's share of the investment expansion would equal its share
of base-year investment. However, as indicated in Table 7-6 (zero
shifting) and Table 7-7 (unitary shifting), this regional uniformity
does not exist. For the subset of manufacturing industries for which
sufficient data are available, the tax substitution with zero CIT
shifting results in an aggregate investment expansion of 10 percent.
However, individualregions experience increasesin investment
ranging from 7.5 percent (West South Central) to 12.5 percent
(New England), even on the assumption of intraindustry propor-
tionality. Although the increase for the South is about equal to that
for the nation, the South's industrial composition is quite different
and its average expansion is explained by the counterbalancing of
such regionally important industries as paper and allied products
(27 percent investment increase, of which the South's share is
38 percent) at the high end, against tobacco (only 4.8 percent

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.178 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
chemicals(investment expansion of 3.1 percent; Southern share,
44 percent) at the sluggish end of the spectrum. The average ex-
pansion of the textile industry, 10.3 percent, of which the South's
share is 65 percent, also contributes to the South's average standing.
Under the assumption of full forward shifting of the CIT, the
national investment expansion in these manufacturing industries is
only 1.9 percent. And in this case the South's share is somewhat
less than average, only 1.7 percent. The smallest expansion is ob-
served in the West South Central region (1.5 percent), the largest
again in New England (2.2 percent). Under both shifting assump-
tions the New England phenomenon is primarily explained by the
rapid expansion of the nonelectrical machinery industry (22.6
percent with zero shifting, 3.4 percent with unitary shifting of the
CIT).
Even granting that the South's share of the investment expansion
may be understated by the assumption of intra-industry proportion-
ality, it would still appear that the region would not benefit dis-
porportionately from the investment response to the tax substi-
tution, although further analysis might indicate otherwise.
In this discussion investment effects by the purchaser (investor)
industry have been examined. While this focus is most important in
longer-run terms, i.e., in terms of differential regional growth, the
short-run consequences would be most sensitive to increases in the
activity of investment goods producer industries. The latter would
not necessarily have the same spatial distributions as investor in-
dustries. While beyond the scope of this examination, it is neverthe-
less desirable that differential regional (and national) consequences
of the investment-induced expansion in industrial, activity be treated
endogenously and examined explicitly.
Our data for the geographic distribution of investment goods
producer industries suggest that the regional distribution of these
increases in industrial activity would not be uniform. In Table 7-8
the regional distribution of all industries is presented. The data in
Table 7-9 indicate the proportion of value added of investment
goods contributed by each producer industry. On this basis the re-
gional impact of the increase in capital goods output can be roughly
projected.Ignoring construction, which would probably closely
approximate the regional distribution of investment purchases and
which accounts for 43 percent of investment value added, the
largest contributionisby the nonelectrical machinery industry
(25 percent). On the basis of the spatial distribution of this in-
dustry's activity in 1969, 9.0 percent of its expansion would be




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.180Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Table 7-9.Industry Share of Investment and Export Value Added and
Imports as Proportion of Domestic Value Added
Shareof PlantShare of Imports as
and Equipment Export Value Percentage of
ValueAdded Added Value Added
1.Agriculture 9.11 6.81
2.Metal mining 0.23 79.75






9.Textiles and apparel 0.07 0.98 15.96
10.Lumber, wood products 0.02 1.06 19.68
11.Furniture and fixtures 0.09 5.22
12.Paper and products 1.43 15.99
13.Printing and publishing 0.66 1.04
14.Chem., plast., drugs, pnt. 7.82 5.32
15.Rubber and leather 0.18 0.90 7.68
16.Footwear 0.02 0.04 24.83
17.Primary metal 3.36 14.12
18.Fabricated metal 1.75 2.51 2.34
19.Nonelect. machinery 24.87 11.36 6.86
20.Electrical equipment 6.84 5.99 8.21
21.Transp. equipment 12.67 12.29 19.72
22.Instruments 3.49 2.22 8.22
23.Misc. manufacturing 0.82 0.69 23.57
24.Transp. and warehousing 1.51 13.31 7.75
25.Communications 1.79 0.41
26.Utilities 0.02 0.29
27.Finance and insurance 1.40
28.Real estate and rental 4.47
29.Hotels and services 11.10
30. Auto repair and services
31.Amusements 0.08
32.Med., ed. serv., and nonprof.
33.Wholesale and retail 1.12
Source: Input-output tables, 1969, from Cybermatics, Inc.
Again, thereis no more justification for the proportionality
assumption in allocating producer than user expansion. Certainly,
the geographic distribution of users (investors) will affect the dis-
tribution of producers, and even if this were not true, it would be
unl,ikely that marginal expansions of output would be distributed
spatially in proportion to total output. Different ages of capital
stocks and different technologies will serve to alter the geographic
distribution of industrial activity in an expansion. Until such proc-
esses and factors are considered it will be impossible adequately to
predict the full regional consequences of federal policy.A Miscellany of Additional Topics181
7.4.3 International Trade Effects
Asin the case of expansion in industries producing investment
goods, it is virtually impossible adequately to project the regional
consequences of an expansion of exports or of import substitutes
that results from the VAT-CIT substitution. As discussion of the
aggregate trade effects (Chapter 6) indicated, the consequences
for the balance of trade were estimated on the basis of aggregate
export and import elasticities and indices of price change. While
involving serious inconsistencies at the national level, this procedure
breaks down completely at the regional level.
However, atleast a qualitative feel for the consequences of
changes in trade flows at the regional level can be obtained from an
examination of Tables 7-8 and 7-9. As was indicated in Table 6-3,
the tax substitution, assuming repeal and full shifting of the CIT,
would lead to an increase in the physical volume of exports of
between $3 billion and $5 bfflion, depending on the relative price
elasticity of export demand, and a real contraction of imports
of between $2 billion and $3 billion. Real consequences of an
equivalent balance-of-trade devaluation (of about 5 percent) would
be quantitatively similar. Tables 7-8 and 7-9 clearly indicate that
many of the most important import-competing industries are heavily
concentrated in the South. Thus, for example, any import-substi-
tution expansion in the textile and paper products industries would
have pronounced stimulative effects in this region. Conversely, the
only quantitatively important export industry in the South is chemi-
cals, but the region lacks any significant concentration of such
major export industries as nonelectrical machinery and transporta-
tion equipment.
7.4.4Potential Wage Adjustments
Asindicated in section 7.3, full replacement of the CIT by a con-
sumption-type VAT has been estimated to increase consumption
prices by 7.7 percent if the CIT reduction is not shifted forward in the
form of lower prices and by 1.7 percent if full shifting occurs. In
either case, these price increases imply corresponding reductions in
real wages. If the supply of labor is initially assumed to be infinitely
elastic at the prevailing real wage, it is possible to project the first-
round wage adjustment to the tax substitution.
Such wage increases would obviously exert upward pressure on
prices. Interindustry variations on this pressure would depend on
differences in labor intensity, measured by employee compensation
as a proportion of value added (Table 7-3). Those industries in which
this ratio is highest would be most affected by this wage adjustment.182 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Jncludedin this class would be such important Southern industries
as textiles (employee compensation 81 percent of value added) and
furniture (82 percent). On the other hand, the employee compensa-
tion ratio is relatively low in oil and gas (26 percent) and tobacco
(17 percent), also important industries in the South.
Under the assumption of zero CIT shifting, of course, net profits
increase by the amount of initial CIT liabilities. It could be assumed
that, at least in the first instance, the increase in employee
pensation is absorbed by profits. The pressure for further-round price
changes would then be greater in those industries in which the in-
crease in employee compensation exceeded the original increase in
net profit (CIT liability). Original CIT liabilities (CITsavings), the
hypothesized labor cost changes, and the difference between the
two, all as proportions of value added, are also indicated in Table
7-3. Further adjustments would be most severe in industries in which
the increase in labor cost exceeds the CIT reduction. In no important
Southern industry would the net excess of labor cost increase over
CIT savings be greater than 2 percent; but in such major regional
industries as tobacco, chemicals, and paper significant net profit
increases would be observed even if the wage increases were fully
absorbed by profits.
In the case of manufacturing industries it is possible to estimate
the aggregate regional effects of CIT removal and wage increases,
as shown in Table 7-10. For manufacturing for the United States
as a whole, the original CIT liability (CITreduction) greatly ex-
ceeds the hypothetical labor cost adjustment. Nationally, the net
increase in profit (CIT liability minus increase in wage bill) in man-
ufacturing is 20 percent of original (pre-tax-substitution) net capital
earnings (Table 7-10, last column). This is explained by the pre-
dominance of the corporate form in manufacturing, as compared
to other sectors. However, regional variations in this net increase are
very great, ranging from only 1.5 percent in New England to 35.3
percent in the West South Central. Significantly, the highest increase
in capital earnings adjusted for wage increases, 30.2 percent, is found
in the combined Southern regions. The consequences of this adjusted
profit increase would be an above-average stimulus to investment in
the South.
As with the discussion of other effects of the tax substitution,
these hypothetical regional consequences do not represent equilib-
rium adjustments to the tax substitution. Rather they characterize
the initial disequilibrium created by this change in tax structure.
Again, it is possible only to identify these first-round consequences

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4184Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
ofthe degree of regional nonneutrality inherent in the assumed plan
of changes in federal policy.
The primary purpose of this section was to indicate the impor-
tance of assessing the differential regional consequences of federal
policies that are not often discussed in regional terms or recognized
to have significant regional impacts. The identification of these
differential regional effects is important for three reasons. First,
to the degree to which a particular area is severely affected by a
federal policy change, compensating adjustments in other federal
programs are indicated. Secondly, in general there exists more than
one federal action which will achieve a nationally desired end, and
the choice between these should be made on the basis of differen-
tial consequences in other dimensions, of which the regional di-
mension would be one of the more important. And finally, the very
effectiveness of a program may itself be affected by its differential
regional impacts. For example, a selective tax reduction designed
to stimulate demand and employment may be primarily inflation-
ary if, due to the characteristics of those benefited, the expansion
is concentrated in industries and areas already relatively fully em-
ployed. Only by explicitly assessing the differential effects of al-
ternative policies in disaggregated, including regional, terms isit
possible to make rational and effective policy choices.
7.5ALLOCATIVE EFFECTS OF THE
TAX SUBSTITUTION
Themost substantive economic argument in favor of the VAT vis-
â-vis the CIT emphasizes itsallocative efficiency characteristics.
Regardless of the assumptions made about short-run CIT shifting,
to the degree to which the CIT is a tax on capital earnings (as op-
posed to, e.g., monopoly surpluses) it will necessarily result in (a)
the inefficient allocation of capital between the corporate and non-
corporate sectors, (b) output price ratios which do not reflect
relative opportunity costs of converting one product into another,
and (c) suboptimal rates of capital accumulation.
Improper allocations of capital between incorporated and un-
incorporated sectors result from differences in the tax treatment of
capital earnings in each sector. If, prior to the introduction of the
CIT, rates of return to capital are equal in the two sectors, imposi-
tion of a CIT will result in a net flow of capital from the incorpor-
ated sector. The immediate effect is to reduce the net rate of return
in the sector subject to the tax. This results in a flow of capital outA Miscellany of Additional Topics785
ofthe taxed sector, the consequence of which is an increase in the
gross-of-tax rate of return in the taxed sector, which now has less
capital, and a decline in the rate of return in the untaxed sector,
which now has relatively more capital. This process continues until
the net-of-tax rates of return are equal in the two sectors.4
Even if the CIT were fully shifted forward, with no initial reduc-
tions in net rates of return in the taxed sector, capital would flow
from the taxed to the nontaxed sector as a result of demand respon-
ses to the relative increase in prices in the taxed sector. Demand
would increase in the unincorporated sector and decline in the in-
corporated sector, resulting in changes in rates of return which would
serve to shift capital (and labor) into the untaxed sector.
Thus, the CiT implies a deadweight welfare loss regardless of
or not it is shifted in the short-run. This is true regardless
of the scope for capital-labor substitution. Even with fixed capital-
labor coefficients, the imposition of the CIT will result in artificially
high relative prices for capital-intensive commodities, with con-
sequent reductions in their consumption.
Furthermore, by reducing the net rate of return to capital, the CIT
will result in reductions in the rate of capital accumulation unless
the supply of savingsis completely interest-inelastic. The initial
response of investment demand to the tax substitution, exammed in
Chapter 5 under the assumption of an unchanged rate of interest,
would necessarily result in an increase in the rate of interest and
possibly an increase in the savings rate.
By comparison, the VAT, with one exception, is proportionate to
price and hence does not serve to alter relative prices. If relative
prices prior to the introduction of the VAT reflect opportunity
costs, post-VAT relative prices will be unchanged and will also re-
flect opportunity costs. The one significant exception is the VAT
treatment of leisure. By not taxing leisure, the VAT would serve to
induce the substitution of leisure for market-purchased goods in con-
sumption, with resultant overconsumption of leisure and under-
supply of labor. This result, of course, assumes that work-leisure
choices would be affected by a decline in the relative price of leisure.
Similarly, the VAT applied to total value added does not result in
distortions of relative factor prices. Thus, the attempted substitution
of labor for capital resulting from a CIT would not occur with the
4. In this discussion, it is assumed that at the margin debt-equity ratios are
limited, and increases in investment must be accompanied by increases in equity
capital.186Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
VAT;net and gross(oftax)relativefactor prices would be identical
in all sectors, with no resultant allocative distortions. The potentially
depressive effects of the CIT on the rate of capital accumulation
would then not derive from the VAT.
In brief, the deadweight loss or excess burden associated with the
CiT is virtually completely avoided under the VAT. It is on this
basis that the VAT is argued to be the allocatively more desirable
tax.